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## Use of Symmetries in Economics: An Overview

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#### Abstract

In this paper, we show that many semi-heuristic econometric formulas can be derived from the natural symmetry requirements. The list of such formulas includes many famous formulas provided by Nobelprize winners, such as Hurwicz optimism-pessimism criterion for decision making under uncertainty, McFadden's formula for probabilistic decision making, Nash's formula for bargaining solution - as well as Cobb-Douglas formula for production, gravity model for trade, etc.


[^0]
## 1 WHY SYMMETRIES

How do people make predictions?
How do people make predictions? How did people know that the Sun will rise in the morning? that a poisonous snake can bite, and its bite can be deadly? Because in the past, the sun was always rising; because in the past, snakes would sometimes bite, and the bitten person would sometimes die.

In all these cases, to make a prediction, we look at similar situations in the past - and make predictions based on what happened in such situations.

Some predictions are more complicated than that - they are based on using formulas, equations, and physical laws. But how do we know that a formula - e.g., Ohm's law - is valid? Because in several previous similar situations, this formula was true, so we conclude that this formula should be true now as well.

How to describe this idea in precise terms? The fact that the same phenomenon is observed in several similar situations means, in effect, that we can make some changes in a situation, and the conclusion will remain the same.

For example, when we check Ohm's law, we can move the laboratory - in which we perform the measurements to a different location, we can rotate it, we can increase it in size, we can change the value of the current, and after all these changes, the formula remains the same - in other words, remains invariant.

Let us describe this invariance in precise terms. We have some phe-
nomenon $p$ depending on the situation $s$. A generic change - such as shift or rotations - means that we replace the original situation $s$ by the changed situation $T(s)$. In these terms, invariance means that the phenomenon remains the same after the change, i.e., that

$$
\begin{equation*}
p(T(s))=p(s) \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

In physics, such invariance is called a symmetry. A particular case of an invariance is when we have, e.g., a spherically symmetric object. If we rotate this object, it will remain the same - this is exactly what symmetry means in geometry.

Because of this example, physicists call each invariance symmetry.

Symmetries play a fundamental role in physics. Our above argument seems to indicate that symmetries play a fundamental role in physics - and indeed they do; see, e.g., [10, 42].

While in the past, new physical theories - such as Newton's mechanics or Maxwell's electromagnetism - were formulated in terms of differential equations, nowadays theories are usually formulated in terms of their symmetries, and equations can be derived from the requirement of invariance with respect to these symmetries. Moreover, it turned out that even more traditional physical equations, such as Newton's or Maxwell's, equations that were not originally derived from symmetries, can actually be uniquely determined by the corresponding symmetries; see, e.g., [11, 12, 22, 25].

Comment. Similar symmetries can be used to explain many algorithms and
heuristics in computer science [35], including several heuristic formulas from fuzzy logic, the empirical efficiency of different activation functions in neural networks, etc.
What about economics? The above arguments about predictions are not limited to physical world: we make predictions about social events - e.g., economic predictions - the same way we make predictions in physics: we recall similar situations in the past, and we predict that the same phenomenon will occur now. In other words, predictions in economics are also, in essence, based on invariance and symmetries.

So, the following natural question appears. As we have mentioned, in physics, many empirical formulas, formulas that were originally derived based on the observations, can often be derived from the basic symmetries. Can we do the same with empirical-based econometric formulas? Can we derive them from some basic symmetries?
Our answer to this question. Our answer to the above questions is "Yes, we can!". In this paper, we will show that many basic semi-heuristic economic laws can actually be derived from the corresponding natural symmetries.

To explain how the economics laws can be thus derived, we first need to analyze which symmetries are natural in the economic context. In this analysis, we will follow an analogy with physics.

## 2 WHICH SYMMETRIES ARE NATURAL

Scaling: case of physics. Equations - like Ohm's law stating that the volt-
age $V$ is equal to the product of the current $I$ and the resistance $R$ - deal with numerical values of different physical quantities. But these numerical values are not absolute, they depend on the choice of the measuring unit.

For example, if instead of using Ampere (A) as a unit of current we use a 1000 times smaller unit milliAmpere (mA), the actual current will not change, but its numerical value will multiply by 1000 . For example, instead of 2 A , we will now have $1000 \cdot 2=2000$ mA .

In general, if we replace the original measuring unit with a unit which is $\lambda$ times smaller, then all the numerical values get multiplied by $\lambda$ : instead of the original value $x$, we now have a new value $x^{\prime}=\lambda \cdot x$. Such a transformation $x \rightarrow \lambda \cdot x$ that multiplies each value $x$ by the same constant $\lambda$ is known as scaling, and invariance with respect to scaling is known as scale-invariance.

What can we deduce from scaleinvariance. Let us first consider the simplest case when we have a dependence of one quantity on the other $y=$ $f(x)$. This is the case, e.g., if we fix a conductor (and thus, fix its resistance), and we analyze how the voltage $y$ measured between the two ends of this conductor depends on the current $x$.

At first glance, it may seem that invariance simply means that when we replace $x$ and $\lambda \cdot x$, the value of $y$ should not change:

$$
\begin{equation*}
f(\lambda \cdot x)=f(x) \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

However, such a definition would lead to a constant function $f(x)$ (at least a function which is constant for $x>0)$ :
indeed, for every $q>0$, by taking $x=1$ and $\lambda=q$, we conclude, from the formula (2), that $f(q)=f(1)$, i.e., that the function $f(x)$ is indeed a constant.

From the physical viewpoint, the reason for this strange result is clear: different measuring units are related. For example, if we change a unit of distance from meters to feet, then, to preserve physical formulas, we also need to change the unit of speed from $\mathrm{m} / \mathrm{sec}$ to $\mathrm{ft} / \mathrm{sec}$. Similarly, if we change the unit of current, then, to preserve the formulas, we need to appropriately change the unit for voltage. In general:

- if we change the unit of $x$ to a $\lambda$ times smaller one and thus change $x$ to $x^{\prime}=\lambda \cdot x$,
- then we should according change the unit of $y$ to a one which is $C$ times different: $y^{\prime}=C \cdot y$, where this $C$ depends on $\lambda: C=C(\lambda)$,
- so that when $y=f(x)$, then in the new units $x^{\prime}$ and $y^{\prime}$, we have the exact same dependence $y^{\prime}=$ $f\left(x^{\prime}\right)$.

Substituting the above expressions for $x^{\prime}$ and $y^{\prime}$ into the formula $y^{\prime}=f\left(x^{\prime}\right)$, we conclude that

$$
\begin{equation*}
f(\lambda \cdot x)=C(\lambda) \cdot f(x) \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

What can we deduce from this scaleinvariance? For simplicity, let us assume that the function $f(x)$ is differentiable - this is a usual assumption in physics. In this case, the function $C(\lambda)=\frac{f(\lambda \cdot x)}{f(x)}$ is also differentiable as a ratio of two differentiable functions. Thus, we can differentiate both side of
equation (3) with respect to $\lambda$ and substitute $\lambda=1$. As a result, we first get $x \cdot \frac{d f}{d x}(\lambda \cdot x)=\frac{d C}{d \lambda}(\lambda) \cdot f(x)$, and then

$$
x \cdot \frac{d f}{d x}(x)=c \cdot f(x)
$$

where we denoted $c \stackrel{\text { def }}{=} C^{\prime}(1)$. We can now separate the variables, i.e., move all the terms containing $x$ and $d x$ to one side, and all the terms containing $f$ and $d f$ to another side. For that, we multiply both sides by $d x$ and divide both sides by $x$ and $f$, getting $\frac{d f}{f}=c \cdot \frac{d x}{x}$. Integrating both sides, we get $\ln (f)=c \cdot \ln (x)+c_{0}$, where $c_{0}$ is an integration constant. Thus,

$$
\begin{aligned}
f & =\exp (\ln (f))=\exp \left(c \cdot \ln (x)+c_{0}\right) \\
& =\exp (c \cdot \ln (x)) \cdot \exp \left(c_{0}\right) \\
& =A \cdot\left(\exp (\ln (x))^{c}=A \cdot x^{c},\right.
\end{aligned}
$$

where we denoted $A \stackrel{\text { def }}{=} \exp \left(c_{0}\right)$.
So, scale-invariance implies the power law $y=A \cdot x^{c}$.

## Comments.

- This result holds without assuming that the function $f(x)$ is differentiable: it is sufficient to assume that it is continuous (or even measurable); see, e.g., [1].
- A similar result holds if we have a dependence on several variables, i.e., if we have a dependence $y=f\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}\right)$ which is scaleinvariant in the sense that for each values $\lambda_{1}, \ldots, \lambda_{n}$, there exists a $C$ such that if $y=f\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}\right)$ then $y^{\prime}=f\left(x_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, x_{n}^{\prime}\right)$, where $x_{i}^{\prime}=\lambda_{i}$. $x_{i}$ and $y^{\prime}=C \cdot y$. Such functions have the form $y=A \cdot x_{1}^{c_{1}} \cdot \ldots \cdot x_{n}^{c_{n}}$.

Scale-invariance is important in economics as well. Many quantities in economics are scale-invariant: for example, the numerical values of income or of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) depend on what monetary units we use. We can use the units of the corresponding country e.g., Dong in the case of Vietnam - or, if we want to compare salaries in different countries, we can use one of the universal currencies, e.g., US dollars.

The actual income is the same no matter what units we use, but numerical values are, of course, different. Similar to physics, in such cases, it makes sense to require that the resulting formulas remain valid if we simply change a monetary unit; of course, we may need to appropriately change related units as well.

Shift: case of physics. For some physical quantities, the numerical value also depends on the starting point. For example, while we usually measure time by using Year 0 as the starting point, many religious calendars - corresponding to Buddhism, Islam, Judaism, etc. - use different starting times.

Similarly, while the usual Celsius scale for temperature starts with the water freezing point as 0 , we can alternatively use the Kelvin scale, in which 0 is the smallest possible temperature $\approx-273 \mathrm{C}$, or the Fahrenheit scale commonly used in the US, in which 0 C corresponds to 32 F .

In general, if we replace the original starting point with a starting point which is $x_{0}$ times smaller or earlier, then all the numerical values are increased by $x_{0}$ : instead of the original value $x$,
we now have a new value $x^{\prime}=x+x_{0}$. Such a transformation $x \rightarrow x+x_{0}$, that adds the same constant $x_{0}$ to each value $x$, is known as shift, and invariance with respect to shift is known as shift-invariance.

## What can we deduce from shift-

 invariance. Let us first consider the case when we have a dependence of one quantity on the other $y=f(x)$. In this case, if we change the starting point for $x$, then, to preserve the formulas, we need to appropriately change the unit for $y$ :- if we change $x$ to $x^{\prime}=x+x_{0}$,
- then we should according change the unit of $y$ to a one which is $C$ times different $y^{\prime}=C \cdot y$, where this $C$ depends on $x_{0}$ : $C=C\left(x_{0}\right)$,
- so that when $y=f(x)$, then in the new units $x^{\prime}$ and $y^{\prime}$, we have the exact same dependence $y^{\prime}=$ $f\left(x^{\prime}\right)$.

Substituting the above expressions for $x^{\prime}$ and $y^{\prime}$ into the formula $y^{\prime}=f\left(x^{\prime}\right)$, we conclude that

$$
\begin{equation*}
f\left(x+x_{0}\right)=C\left(x_{0}\right) \cdot f(x) \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

What can we deduce from this shiftinvariance? Let us assume that the function $f(x)$ is differentiable. In this case, the function $C\left(x_{0}\right)=\frac{f\left(x+x_{0}\right)}{f(x)}$ is also differentiable - as a ratio of two differentiable functions. Thus, we can differentiate both side of equation (4) with respect to $x_{0}$ and substitute $x_{0}=0$. As a result, we first get $\frac{d f}{d x}\left(x+x_{0}\right)=$
$\frac{d C}{d x_{0}}\left(x_{0}\right) \cdot f(x)$, and then

$$
\frac{d f}{d x}=c \cdot f
$$

where we denoted $c \stackrel{\text { def }}{=} C^{\prime}(0)$.
We can now separate the variables, i.e., move all the terms containing $x$ and $d x$ to one side, and all the terms containing $f$ and $d f$ to another side. For that, we multiply both sides by $d x$ and divide both sides by $f$, getting $\frac{d f}{f}=$ $c \cdot d x$. Integrating both sides, we get $\ln (f)=c \cdot x+c_{0}$, where $c_{0}$ is an integration constant. Thus,

$$
\begin{aligned}
f & =\exp (\ln (f))=\exp \left(c \cdot x+c_{0}\right) \\
& =A \cdot \exp (c \cdot x)
\end{aligned}
$$

where we denoted $A \xlongequal{\text { def }} \exp \left(c_{0}\right)$.
So, shift-invariance implies the exponential dependence $y=A \cdot \exp (c \cdot x)$.

## Comments.

- This result holds without assuming that the function $f(x)$ is differentiable: it is sufficient to assume that it is continuous (or measurable); see, e.g., [1].
- A similar result holds if we have a dependence on several variables, i.e., if we have a dependence $y=f\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}\right)$ which is shiftinvariant in the sense that for each values $x_{01}, \ldots, x_{0 n}$, there exists a $C$ such that if $y=f\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}\right)$ then $y^{\prime}=f\left(x_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, x_{n}^{\prime}\right)$, where $x_{i}^{\prime}=x_{i}+x_{0 i}$ and $y^{\prime}=C \cdot y$. Such functions have the form $y=$ $A \cdot \exp \left(c_{1} \cdot x_{1}+\ldots+c_{n} \cdot x_{n}\right)$.

Shift-invariance is important in economics as well. Many quantities in economics are shift-invariant. For example, when we compute the income of people living in countries with socialized medicine, we can compute this income in two ways:

- we can simply take the income as is,
- or, if want a fair comparison with income in countries like US, where there is no socialized medicine, we add the average cost of medical expenses to the income.

Additivity. How can we estimate the force $f(q)$ with which an electric field acts on a body of a known electric charge $q$ ? If this body consists of two components, then there are two ways to do it:

- we can apply the formula $f(q)$ to the body as a whole,
- or we can apply this formula to both components, with charges $q^{\prime}$ and $q^{\prime \prime}$, find the forces $f^{\prime}=f\left(q^{\prime}\right)$ and $f^{\prime \prime}=f\left(q^{\prime \prime}\right)$ acting on each of the components, and then add these forces into a single value $f\left(q^{\prime}\right)+f\left(q^{\prime \prime}\right)$.

The second possibility come from the fact that both charges and forces are $a d$ ditive in the sense that:

- the overall electric charge $q$ of a two-component body in which two components have electric charges $q^{\prime}$ and $q^{\prime \prime}$ is equal to the sum of these two charges, and
- the overall force acting on a twocomponent body is equal to the sum of the forces acting on each of the components.

It is reasonable to require that the two estimates lead to the same number, i.e., that

$$
f\left(q^{\prime}+q^{\prime \prime}\right)=f\left(q^{\prime}\right)+f\left(q^{\prime \prime}\right)
$$

In general, we have functions that satisfy the following property for all $x$ and $y$ :

$$
\begin{equation*}
f(x+y)=f(x)+f(y) \tag{5}
\end{equation*}
$$

Such functions are known as additive.
What can we deduce from additivity. Let us consider the case when we have a dependence of one quantity on the other $y=f(x)$. Let us assume that the function $f(x)$ is differentiable. In this case, we can differentiate both side of equation (5) with respect to $y$ and then substitute $y=0$. As a result, we first get $\frac{d f}{d x}(x+y)=\frac{d f}{d y}(y)$, and then $\frac{d f}{d x}(x)=c$, where we denoted $c \stackrel{\text { def }}{=} f^{\prime}(0)$. Integrating both sides of the formula $\frac{d f}{d x}(x)=c$, we get $f(x)=c \cdot x+c_{0}$, where $c_{0}$ is an integration constant.

For $x=0$, the formula (5) takes the form $f(0)=2 f(0)$, hence $f(0)=0$. Thus, $c_{0}=0$, and $f(x)=c \cdot x$.

So, additivity implies the linear dependence $y=c \cdot x$.

## Comments.

- This result holds without assuming that the function $f(x)$ is differentiable: it is sufficient to assume that it is continuous (or measurable); see, e.g., [1, 23].
- A similar result holds if we have a dependence on several variables, i.e., if we have a dependence $y=f\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}\right)$ which is additive in the sense that for each values $x_{1}^{\prime}, x_{1}^{\prime \prime}, \ldots, x_{n}^{\prime}, x_{n}^{\prime}$, if $y^{\prime}=f\left(x_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, x_{n}^{\prime}\right)$ and $y^{\prime \prime}=f\left(x_{1}^{\prime \prime}, \ldots, x_{n}^{\prime \prime}\right)$, then $y=$ $f\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}\right)$, where $x_{i}=x_{i}^{\prime}+x_{i}^{\prime \prime}$ and $y=y^{\prime}+y^{\prime \prime}$.

Additivity is important in economics as well. Many quantities in economics are additive:

- the overall population of a country is equal to the sum of populations in different provinces,
- the overall GDP of a country is equal to the sum of GDPs of different provinces,
- the overall trade volume of a country is equal to the sum of the trade volume of different provinces, etc.

Thus, if we are interested in estimating the trade volume based on the GDP, we can estimate this trade volume in two ways:

- we can plug in the overall GDP into the corresponding formula,
- or we can use this formula to estimate the trade volume of each province, and then add up the resulting estimates.

It is reasonable to require that these two estimates lead to the same result.

Summary. In this paper, we consider three types of natural symmetries:

- scale-invariance $f(\lambda \cdot x)=C(\lambda) \cdot f(x)$ that leads to the power law:

$$
f(x)=A \cdot x^{c} ;
$$

- shift-invariance $f\left(x+x_{0}\right)=C\left(x_{0}\right) \cdot f(x)$ that leads to the exponential dependence:

$$
f(x)=A \cdot \exp (c \cdot x) ;
$$

- additivity $f(x+y)=f(x)+f(y)$ that leads to the linear dependence:

$$
f(x)=c \cdot x
$$

## 3 HOW WE (SHOULD) MAKE DECISIONS: THE NOTION OF UTILITY

Need to describe human preferences. In the previous section, we talked about numerical economic quantities like population, GDP, income, etc. However, economy is driven by human preferences. So, to adequately describe economic processes, in addition to the above-mentioned numerical characteristics, we must also describe human preferences. How can we do it?

How can we describe human preferences? A natural way to describe human preferences is as follows; see, e.g., [13, 24, 29, 36, 40]. We select two extreme alternatives:

- a very bad alternative $A_{-}$which is worse than any of the actual options, and
- a very good alternative $A_{+}$which is better than any of the actual options.

Then, for each value $p$ from the interval $[0,1]$, we can form a lottery $L(p)$ in which we get $A_{+}$with probability $p$ and $A_{-}$with the remaining probability $1-p$. When $p=0$, the lottery $L(0)$ is simply equivalent to $A_{-}$. The larger $p$, the better the alternative. Finally, when $p=1$, we get $A(1)=L_{+}$.

Thus, we get a continuous scale for describing preferences. For each realistic alternative $A$, it is better than $L(0)=A_{-}$and worse than $L(1)=A_{+}$: $L(0)<A<L(1)$. Of course, if $L(p)<$ $A$ and $p^{\prime}<p$, then $L\left(p^{\prime}\right)<A$. Similarly, if $A<L(p)$ and $p<p^{\prime}$, then $A<L\left(p^{\prime}\right)$. Thus, one can show that there exists a threshold value $u$ such that:

- for $p<u$, we have $L(p)<A$, and
- for $p>u$, we have $A<L(p)$.

For example, we can take $u=\sup \{p$ : $L(p)<A\}$. This value $u$ is called the utility of the given alternative $A$ and is denoted by $u(A)$.

We can reformulate the threshold statement by saying that the alternative $A$ is equivalent to the lottery $L(u)$, where the equivalent has to be understood in the above threshold sense, i.e., equivalently, that $L(u-\varepsilon)<A<$ $L(u+\varepsilon)$ for all $\varepsilon>0$. In this sense, the utility $u(A)$ can be defined as a probability $u$ for which the alternative $A$ is equivalent to the lottery $L(u)$.

What if we select a different pair $A_{-}$and $A_{+}$? The numerical value $u(A)$ of utility obtained by the above construction depends on the choice of $A_{-}$ and $A_{+}$. If we select another pair $A_{-}^{\prime}$ and $A_{+}^{\prime}$, then, for the same alternative, we will get a different utility value
$u^{\prime}(A)$. What is the relation between $u(A)$ and $u^{\prime}(A)$ ?

To answer this question, let us consider the case when $A_{-}^{\prime}<A_{-}<A_{+}<$ $A_{+}^{\prime}$ - other cases can be treated similarly. In this case, since $A_{-}$and $A_{+}$ are between $A_{-}^{\prime}$ and $A_{+}^{\prime}$, we can find a utility $u^{\prime}\left(A_{-}\right)$and $u^{\prime}\left(A_{+}\right)$of each of them with respect to the pair $\left(A_{-}^{\prime}, A_{+}^{\prime}\right)$. Then:

- $A_{-}$is equivalent to a $\left(A_{-}^{\prime}, A_{+}^{\prime}\right)$ lottery $L^{\prime}\left(u^{\prime}\left(A_{-}\right)\right)$, in which we get $A_{+}^{\prime}$ with probability $u^{\prime}\left(A_{-}\right)$ and $A_{-}^{\prime}$ with the remaining probability $1-u^{\prime}\left(A_{-}\right)$, and
- $A_{+}$is equivalent to a $\left(A_{-}^{\prime}, A_{+}^{\prime}\right)$ lottery $L^{\prime}\left(u^{\prime}\left(A_{+}\right)\right)$, in which we get $A_{+}^{\prime}$ with probability $u^{\prime}\left(A_{+}\right)$ and $A_{-}^{\prime}$ with the remaining probability $1-u^{\prime}\left(A_{+}\right)$.
Each alternative $A$ with utility $u(A)$ is, by definition of utility, equivalent to a lottery $L(u(A))$ in which we get $A_{+}$with probability $u(A)$ and $A_{-}$with probability $1-u(A)$. Each of the alternatives $A_{-}$ and $A_{+}$is, as we have just mentioned, itself equivalent to a lottery. Thus, the original alternative $A$ is equivalent to a complex lottery, in which:
- first, we select $A_{+}$with probability $u(A)$ and $A_{-}$with the probability $1-u(A)$, and then,
- depending on what we selected on the first step, we select $A_{+}^{\prime}$ with probability $u^{\prime}\left(A_{+}\right)$or $u^{\prime}\left(A_{-}\right)$and we select $A_{-}^{\prime}$ with the remaining probability.
As a result of this complex lottery, we always get either $A_{-}^{\prime}$ or $A_{+}^{\prime}$. The probability to get $A_{+}^{\prime}$ can be computed by
adding probabilities corresponding to two different ways of getting $A_{+}^{\prime}$ : it is $u(A) \cdot u^{\prime}\left(A_{+}\right)+(1-u(A)) \cdot u^{\prime}\left(A_{-}\right)$. But by definition of a $\left(A_{-}^{\prime}, A_{+}^{\prime}\right)$-based utility, this probability is exactly the utility $u^{\prime}(A)$. Thus,

$$
\begin{aligned}
& u^{\prime}(A)=u(A) \cdot u^{\prime}\left(A_{+}\right)+(1-u(A)) \cdot u^{\prime}\left(A_{-}\right) \\
& =u^{\prime}\left(A_{-}\right)+u(A) \cdot\left(u^{\prime}\left(A_{+}\right)-u^{\prime}\left(A_{i}\right)\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

Thus, the transformation from the old utility $u(A)$ to the new utility $u^{\prime}(A)$ follows the same formulas as when we change the starting point and the measuring unit:

- $u^{\prime}\left(A_{-}\right)$plays the role of shift $x_{0}$, and
- the difference $u^{\prime}\left(A_{+}\right)-u^{\prime}\left(A_{-}\right)$ plays the role of the scaling $\lambda$.

So, to analyze the formulas involving utility, we can also use concepts of scaleand shift-invariance.

## 4 HOW UTILITY DEPENDS ON MONEY

Utility $u$ is not proportional to money $m$. It is an empirical fact that utility is not proportional to money. Intuitively, this is easy to understand: when a person has nothing, adding $\$ 10$ feels great, but when this person already has $\$ 1000$, adding $\$ 10$ does not change much.

So, how is utility depending on money?

Natural starting point. In general, as have mentioned, utilities are defined modulo an arbitrary linear transformation, so we can shift them and/or scale them.

For money, there is a natural starting point corresponding to 0 amount, i.e., corresponding to the case when we have no savings and no debts. Without losing generality, let us select a utility function for which this 0 -money situation corresponds to 0 utility. Once the starting point is thus fixed, the only remaining utility transformation is scaling $u \rightarrow k \cdot u$.

So what is the dependence of $u(m)$ ? As we have mentioned earlier, the numerical value describing the amount of money depends on the choice of the monetary unit. It is therefore reasonable to require that the formula $u(m)$ describing the dependence of utility $u$ on money $m$ does not change if we simply change the monetary unit.

In precise terms, this means that if we select a different monetary unit, i.e., if we consider new numerical values $m^{\prime}=\lambda \cdot m$, then we will get the exact same dependence $u^{\prime}\left(m^{\prime}\right)$ of utility of money, probably after appropriately re-scaling the utility into $u^{\prime}=C \cdot u$. We already know that this scale-invariance leads to the power law $u=A \cdot m^{c}-$ and this is exactly what was experimentally observed, with $c \approx 0.5-$ see, e.g. [17, 28].

## 5 PROBABILISTIC CHOICE

Formulation of the problem. The traditional utility-based decision theory assumes that, when faced several times with the same several alternatives, the person would make the same selection. In reality, if we repeatedly offer the same choice to a person, this person will, in general, select different alterna-
tives in different iterations. Specifically, alternatives with low utility will practically never be selected, the alternative with the largest utility value will be selected most frequently, but alternatives whose utility is close to the largest will also be selected sometimes.

In such situations, all we can try to predict is the frequency (probability) with which each alternative is selected.

Analysis of the problem. As we have mentioned, the larger the utility of an alternative $a$, the higher the probability that this alternative will be selected. Thus, we can say that the probability $p(a)$ of selecting the alternative $a$ is proportional to some monotonic function $f(u)$ of its utility: $p(a)=C \cdot f(u(a))$. The coefficient of proportionality $C$ can be determined from the condition that one of the alternatives is always selected, and thus, the sum of the selections probabilities should be equal to 1: $\sum_{b} p(b)=C \cdot \sum_{b} f(u(b))=1$, hence $C=\frac{1}{\sum_{b} f(u(b))}$ and $p(a)=\frac{f(u(a))}{\sum_{b} f(u(b))}$.

In these terms, the question is: which monotonic function $f(u)$ should we choose?
Let us apply natural symmetries. As we have mentioned, utility is defined modulo an arbitrary shift $u \rightarrow u^{\prime}=$ $u+u_{0}$. It is reasonable to select the monotonic function $f(u)$ in such a way that the resulting probabilities do not change if we apply such a shift, i.e., if we replace each value $u(a)$ by a shifted value $u^{\prime}(a)=u(a)+u_{0}$.

The original probability is proportional to $f(u)$, the shifted one is proportional to $f\left(u+u_{0}\right)$. So, we conclude
that the shifted function $f\left(u+u_{0}\right)$ must be proportional to the original one $f(u)$, i.e., that we should have $f\left(u+u_{0}\right)=$ $C\left(u_{0}\right) \cdot f(u)$ for some proportionality coefficient $C\left(u_{0}\right)$.

We already know that this functional equation leads to $f(u)=A$. $\exp \left(c_{0} \cdot u\right)$ for some $c_{0}$, and thus, to $p(a)=\frac{\exp \left(c_{0} \cdot u(a)\right)}{\sum_{b} \exp \left(c_{0} \cdot u(b)\right)}[21]$. This is exactly the formula for which D. McFadden received his Nobel Prize in 2011; see, e.g., $[32,33,44]$.

Comment. As we have mentioned earlier, utility is determined not only modulo shift, it is also determined modulo an arbitrary scaling $u \rightarrow u^{\prime}=k \cdot u$. Clearly, McFadden's formula is not invariant with respect to scalings. What if instead of shift-invariance we require scale-invariance?

In other words, what if we require that the probabilities $p(a)$ do not change if we replace each utility $u(a)$ with a re-scaled one $u^{\prime}(a)=k \cdot u(a)$ ? Similarly to the shift-invariance case, this requirement implies that $f(k \cdot u)=$ $C(k) \cdot f(u)$ for some $C(k)$, and we know that this leads to $f(u)=A \cdot u^{c}$ for some $c$ and thus, to $p(a)=\frac{(u(a))^{c}}{\sum_{b}(u(b))^{c}}[21]$. This explains the empirical formula described in [16].

## 6 DECISION MAKING UNDER INTERVAL UNCERTAINTY

Formulation of the problem. If we know the exact utility value $u(a)$ corresponding to each possible action $a$, then it is reasonable to select the action
that leads to the largest possible value of utility.

However, in many practical situations, we do not know the exact consequences of each possible action and therefore, we cannot determine the exact utility value of each action. At best, for each possible action $a$, we know the bounds on the utility, i.e., we know the interval $[\underline{u}(a), \bar{u}(a)]$ that contains the actual (unknown) utility value. In such situations of interval uncertainty, how should we make a decision?

Analysis of the problem. The simplest case of the above problem is when:

- we have two alternatives;
- for the first alternative, we know the interval $[\underline{u}, \bar{u}]$; and
- for the second alternative, we know the exact utility value $u$.

Let is fix $\underline{u}$ and $\bar{u}$ and consider different possible values $u$.

When the value $u$ is small (e.g., when $u<\underline{u}$ ), the first alternative is clearly better. When the value $u$ is large (e.g., when $\bar{u}<u$ ), the second alternative is clearly better. Thus, similarly to the definition of utility, there exists a threshold value $u_{0}(\underline{u}, \bar{u})$ such that:

- when $u<u_{0}$, the first alternative is better, and
- when $u_{0}<u$, the second alternative is better.

In this sense, the interval $[\underline{u}, \bar{u}]$ is equivalent to the threshold value $u_{0}$.

Thus, in general, to compare two or more intervals:

- we compute, for each of these intervals $[\underline{u}(a), \bar{u}(a)]$, the corresponding equivalent value $u_{0}(\underline{u}(a), \bar{u}(a))$, and then
- we select the action $a$ for which this equivalent value is the largest.
So, the remaining problem is how to find the equivalent value $u_{0}(\underline{u}, \bar{u})$.
Let us use symmetries. As we have mentioned, utility is defined modulo shifts and scalings. It is therefore reasonable to require that the relation $u=u_{0}(\underline{u}, \bar{u})$ does not change under such transformations, i.e., that:
- this relation be shift-invariant: if $u_{0}(\underline{u}, \bar{u})=u$, then for each possible shift $\Delta u$, we have $u_{0}(\underline{u}+$ $\Delta u, \bar{u}+\Delta u)=u+\Delta u$; and
- this relation be scale-invariant: if $u_{0}(\underline{u}, \bar{u})=u$, then for each possible scaling $k>0$, we have $u_{0}(k$. $\underline{u}, k \cdot \bar{u})=k \cdot u$.

Let us denote, by $\alpha_{H}$, a utility value $u_{0}(0,1)$ which is equivalent to the simplest possible interval $[0,1]$. Clearly, since all the possible values from this interval are greater than or equal to 0 , the equivalent value should also be better than or equivalent to 0 , i.e., we should have $\alpha_{H} \geq 0$. Similarly, we should have $\alpha_{H} \leq 1$.

For each pair of values $\underline{u}<\bar{u}$, due to scale-invariance with $k=\bar{u}-\underline{u}$, the equation $u_{0}(0,1)=\alpha_{H}$ implies that $u_{0}(0, \bar{u}-\underline{u})=(\bar{u}-\underline{u}) \cdot \alpha_{H}$. Then, shiftinvariance with $\Delta u=\underline{u}$ implies that $u_{0}(\underline{u}, \bar{u})=\underline{u}+(\bar{u}-\underline{u}) \cdot \alpha_{H}$. The righthand side of this formula can be rewritten as

$$
u_{0}(\underline{u}, \bar{u})=\alpha_{H} \cdot \bar{u}+\left(1-\alpha_{H}\right) \cdot \underline{u} ;
$$

see, e.g., [24]. This is exactly the formula for decision making under interval uncertainty for which Leo Hurwicz received his Nobel prize [15, 29]. Thus, Hurwicz's formula can be derived from natural symmetries.

Comment. Hurwicz's formula is known as the optimism-pessimism criterion, for the following reason:

- if $\alpha_{H}=1$, this means that the person only takes into account the best possible scenario when making a decision; in other words, this person is a complete optimist;
- if $\alpha_{H}=0$, this means that the person only takes into account the worst possible scenario when making a decision; in other words, this person is a complete pessimist;
- intermediate values $\alpha_{H}$ between 0 and 1 mean that the person take into account both best-case and worst-case scenarios.


## 7 TAKING FUTURE EFFECTS INTO ACCOUNT WHEN MAKING A DECISION

Formulation of the problem. When making economic decisions, people naturally value future gains as less beneficial that current ones. An option is which a person gets $\$ 1$ at time $t$ is clearly worth less that a dollar now. This makes sense, since if we get a dollar now, we can invest it - e.g., deposit it in a savings account - and thus, get a larger amount by time $t$. This phenomenon is known as discounting.

How to take this phenomenon into account? In other words, what is the price $D(t)$ that a person should be willing to pay for the option of getting $\$ 1$ at moment $t$ ?

Analysis of the problem. To estimate $D(t)$, let us use shift-invariance. Specifically, for any pair of values $t$ and $t_{0}$, the quality $D\left(t+t_{0}\right)$ can be estimated in two different ways:

- we can directly estimate the desired quantity as $D\left(t+t_{0}\right)$;
- alternatively, we can take into account that $\$ 1$ at moment $t+t_{0}$ (which is $t$ periods after the moment $t_{0}$ ) is equivalent to $D(t)$ dollars at moment $t_{0}$; each dollar at moment $t_{0}$ is equivalent to $D\left(t_{0}\right)$ dollars now; thus, $D(t)$ dollars at moment $t_{0}$ are equivalent to $D\left(t_{0}\right) \cdot D(t)$ dollars now.

It is reasonable to require that these two estimates coincide, i.e., that

$$
D\left(t+t_{0}\right)=D\left(t_{0}\right) \cdot D(t) .
$$

This formula is a particular case of the general shift-invariance, so we conclude that $D(t)=A \cdot \exp (c \cdot t)$ for some $A$ and $c$. Substituting this expression into the above formula, we conclude that $A=1$ and thus, $D(t)=\exp (c \cdot t)$. This is exactly the usual formula for discounting; see, e.g., $[8,14,18,19,20,30$, 31, 39, 46]. Thus, the usual formula for discounting can be derived from natural symmetries.
Comment. In [46], we showed that symmetries can also be used to explain the empirically observed devia-
tions from the usual discounting formula; see $[8,14,18,19,20,30,31,39]$ for details on these deviations.

## 8 GROUP DECISION MAKING

Formulation of the problem. What if a group of people needs to make a joint decision?

To properly answer this question, we also need to take into account that the group may be unable to come to an agreement. The resulting situation is known as the status quo situation.
Analysis of the problem. We can always shift each individual utility so that for the status quo solution, the utility of each participant is 0 .

Once this status quo point is fixed, the only possible symmetries are scalings $u_{i} \rightarrow u_{i}^{\prime}=k_{i} \cdot u_{i}$. It is reasonable to require that the decision criterion does not change under this scaling.

A reasonable idea is to have an objective function that combines $n$ utilities $u_{1}, \ldots, u_{n}$ into a single utility value $u=f\left(u_{1}, \ldots, u_{n}\right)$. As we have analyzed earlier, in this case, scale-invariance implies that $f\left(u_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}\right)=A \cdot u_{1}^{c_{1}} \ldots . . u_{n}^{c_{n}}$.

It is also reasonable to require that there is no prior preference to any of the participants. In precise terms, this means that the decision should not change if we simply rename the participants. With respect to the above objective function, this means that all the coefficients $c_{i}$ must coincide, so that $f\left(u_{1}, \ldots, u_{n}\right)=A \cdot\left(u_{1} \cdot \ldots \cdot u_{n}\right)^{c}$.

Maximizing this function is equivalent to maximizing the product $u_{1} \cdot \ldots$. $u_{n} ;[27]$. This is exactly the bargaining solution proposed by nobelist John

Nash [34, 29]. Thus, Nash's solution can also be derived from symmetries.

## 9 COBB-DOUGLAS PRODUCTION FUNCTION

Formulation of the problem. If we know the country's overall capital $K$ and overall labor input $L$, how can we estimate the country's production $Y$ ? In other words, what function $f(K, L)$ should we use to estimate $Y$ ?

Analysis of the problem. The numerical values of all these quantities capital, labor, and production - depend on what units we use to measure them. It is therefore reasonable to require that the corresponding model $Y \approx f(K, L)$ does not change if we simply change the corresponding units. In other words, it is reasonable to require that the dependence $f(K, L)$ be scale-invariant.

We already know that scaleinvariance implies that $Y=A \cdot K^{\alpha} \cdot L^{\beta}$, for some $\alpha$ and $\beta$. This is exactly the well-known Cobb-Douglas production function; see, e.g., [7, 45, 23]. Thus, the Cobb-Douglas formula can also be derived from natural symmetries.

## 10 GRAVITY MODEL FOR TRADE

Formulation of the problem. How can we estimate the volume of trade $t_{i j}$ between the two countries $i$ and $j$ ? Clearly, the larger each country's GDPs $g_{i}$ and $g_{j}$, the more trade we can expect. Similarly, the smaller the distance $r_{i j}$ between the two countries, the more trade we expect. What will be a good
estimate for $t_{i j}$ as a function of $g_{i}, g_{j}$, and $r_{i j}: t_{i j}=f\left(g_{i}, g_{j}, r_{i j}\right)$ ?

Analysis of the problem. As we have mentioned earlier, we can apply this formula to countries as a whole or to different regions of these countries - and then add up the resulting trade volumes. It is reasonable to require that the resulting estimate for the trade volume should not depend on whether we consider the country as a whole or its regions. This means that the dependence on $g_{i}$ should be additive: $f\left(g_{i}^{\prime}+\right.$ $\left.g_{i}^{\prime \prime}, g_{j}, r_{i j}\right)=f\left(g_{i}^{\prime}, g_{j}, r_{i j}\right)+f\left(g_{i}^{\prime \prime}, g_{j}, r_{i j}\right)$. As we have shown, this requirement implies that the function $f$ should be linear in $g_{i}: f\left(g_{i}, g_{j}, r_{i j}\right)=g_{i} \cdot F\left(g_{j}, r_{i j}\right)$, for some coefficient $F\left(g_{j}, r_{i j}\right)$ depending on $g_{j}$ and $r_{i j}$.

Similarly, we can consider the country $j$ as a whole or as a combination of its regions. A similar additivity requirement enables us to conclude that the trade volume should be linear in $g_{j}$ as well, so $f\left(g_{i}, g_{j}, r_{i j}\right)=g_{i} \cdot g_{j} \cdot H\left(r_{i j}\right)$ for some function $H(r)$.

To find the function $H(r)$, it is reasonable to take into account that the distance can be measured in different units, and the formula for the trade should not change whether we use kilometers or miles. The resulting scaleinvariance implies that $H(r)=A \cdot r^{c}$ for some $A$ and $c$. Thus, we arrive at the following formula for the trade volume between the two countries: $t_{i j}=$ $A \cdot g_{i} \cdot g_{j} \cdot r_{i j}^{c}[26]$.

This is exactly the well-known gravity model; see, e.g., $[2,3,4,38,43]$. Thus, the gravity model can indeed be derived from natural symmetries.
Comment. The usual gravity model
only takes into account the GDPs $g_{i}$ and $g_{j}$ of the two countries. What if we also take into account their populations $p_{i}$ and $p_{j}$ ? In this case, additivity implies that $t_{i j}$ is linear in $g_{i}$ and $p_{i}$, and it is also linear in $g_{j}$ and $p_{j}$. Thus, the overall dependence is bilinear, i.e., we get the following more complex (and hopefully, more accurate) estimate [26]:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& t_{i j}=\left(G_{g g} \cdot g_{i} \cdot g_{j}+G_{g p} \cdot g_{i} \cdot p_{j}\right. \\
& \left.+G_{p g} \cdot p_{i} \cdot g_{j}+G_{p p} \cdot p_{i} \cdot p_{j}\right) / r_{i j}^{c}
\end{aligned}
$$

## 11 LINEAR ARMAX-GARCH MODELS

Formulation of the problem. How can we predict the future value $X_{t}$ of an economic quantity $X$ based on its previous values $X_{t-1}, \quad X_{t-2}, \ldots$, and on the values $d_{t}, d_{t-1}, \ldots$, of an external quantity $d$ that affects $X$ ? In other words, which function $f\left(X_{t-1}, X_{t-2}, \ldots, d_{t}, d_{t-1}, \ldots\right)$ provides the best estimate for $X_{t}$ ?
Analysis of the problem. In many cases, the quantities $X$ in which we are interested are additive - like GDP. Similarly, the quantities $d$ that affect $X$ are usually additive - e.g., the amount of foreign direct investment. In such cases, it is reasonable to require that the prediction should not depend on whether we consider the country as a whole or as a combination of several inputs, i.e., to require that
$f\left(X_{t-1}^{\prime}+X_{t-1}^{\prime \prime}, X_{t-2}^{\prime}+X_{t-2}^{\prime \prime}, \ldots, d_{t}^{\prime}+d_{t}^{\prime \prime}\right.$, $\left.d_{t-1}^{\prime}+d_{t-1}^{\prime \prime}, \ldots\right)=f\left(X_{t-1}^{\prime}, X_{t-2}^{\prime}\right.$,
$\left.\ldots, d_{t}^{\prime}, d_{t-1}^{\prime}, \ldots\right)$
$+f\left(X_{t-1}^{\prime \prime}, X_{t-2}^{\prime \prime}, \ldots, d_{t}^{\prime \prime}, d_{t-1}^{\prime \prime}, \ldots\right)$.
We know that this additivity requirement implies that the function $f$ is lin-
ear, i.e., that

$$
X_{t} \approx \sum_{i=1}^{p} \varphi_{i} \cdot X_{t-i}+\sum_{i=1}^{b} \eta_{i} \cdot d_{t-i},
$$

for appropriate coefficients $\varphi_{i}$ and $\eta_{i}$.
To get an even more accurate prediction, it is desirable to take into account how accurately this model predicted the past values of $X_{t}$, i.e., what were the differences $\varepsilon_{t-1}, \varepsilon_{t-2}, \ldots$, between the actual values and the predictions. For additive quantities and linear models, the differences are also additive, so we get a more accurate linear model

$$
\begin{aligned}
X_{t} & \approx \sum_{i=1}^{p} \varphi_{i} \cdot X_{t-i}+\sum_{i=1}^{b} \eta_{i} \cdot d_{t-i} \\
& +\sum_{i=1}^{q} \theta_{i} \cdot \varepsilon_{t-i},
\end{aligned}
$$

for some $\theta_{i}$.
Taking into account that the inaccuracy of this model is exactly what we denoted by $\varepsilon_{t}$, we this conclude that

$$
\begin{aligned}
X_{t} & =\sum_{i=1}^{p} \varphi_{i} \cdot X_{t-i}+\sum_{i=1}^{b} \eta_{i} \cdot d_{t-i}+\varepsilon_{t} \\
& +\sum_{i=1}^{q} \theta_{i} \cdot \varepsilon_{t-i}
\end{aligned}
$$

see, e.g., [37].
This is exactly the AutoRegressive-Moving-Average model with eXogenous inputs (ARMAX) [6, 9]. Thus, this model can indeed be justified by the corresponding symmetries.
Comment. If we denote the standard deviation of $\varepsilon_{t}$ by $\sigma_{t}$, then similar arguments - based on the fact that for independent random variables, variance $\sigma_{t}^{2}$ is additive - show that the dynamics of
standard deviations $\sigma_{t}$ is described by a linear formula

$$
\sigma_{t}^{2}=\alpha_{0}+\sum_{i=1}^{\ell} \beta_{i} \cdot \sigma_{t-i}^{2}+\sum_{i=1}^{k} \alpha_{i} \cdot \varepsilon_{t-i}^{2}
$$

see, e.g., [37]. This is exactly the Generalized AutoRegressive Conditional Heterosckedasticity (GARCH) model [5, 6,

9]. Thus, GARCH formulas also follow from the natural symmetries.

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